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This paper discusses how mystery was imprinted into the Jesuit Spiritual Exercises, supporting 
their diffusion across space and time. It shows that the book of the Spiritual Exercises is a 
practice in itself and fosters a practice or set of practices. The book is more than an object: it is 
an action, unleashed not by the specification of what actions it dictates but by the mystery the 
‘book-as-practice’ carries. The paper contributes to the literature on practice-driven 
institutionalism, namely by showing how mystery furthers our understanding of the mutual 
constitution of practices and institutions. The Spiritual Exercises have been practiced for more 
than four centuries, even though their meaning is not stable and they are never fully understood. 
Therefore, our paper asks: how do the Jesuits understand what they have to do if the book does 
not prescribe everything? We argue that it is indeed this mystery that distinguishes religious 
practices, explaining their endurance across time and space and, henceforth, their 
institutionalisation. We show that the Spiritual Exercises are to be practiced and it is this 
practicing that allows them to diffuse and institutionalise a new understanding of how the 
individual relates to God. ‘God’s will’ is searched through the practicing, without ever being 
determined by the practice. It is by practicing the book that the mystery of ‘God’s will’ reveals 
itself. Moreover, ‘God’s will’ is never known or knowable. Instead, it is embodied and felt 
while practicing the book of the Exercises. Emotions thus reconcile, through mystery, the new 
logics and the practicing of it. Our paper contributes to practice-driven institutionalism by 
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“i trenini che facciamo alle nostre feste […]  
so’ i più belli di tutta Roma […]  
perché non vanno da nessuna parte” 





Institutionalism and practice theory have grown apart, with the former focused on contextual 
and broader explanations of phenomena and the latter zooming-in daily and mundane 
interactions. However, there have been calls for greater dialogue between institutional and 
practice driven approaches (Jarzabkowski, Kaplan, Seidl, & Whittington, 2015; Smets, 
Aristidou & Whittington, 2017). Practice-driven institutionalism (PDI; Smets, Aristidou & 
Whittington, 2017) follows Schatzki's (2001, p. 2) definition of practices as ‘embodied, 
materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical 
understanding(s)’. These ‘shared practical understanding(s)’ (Schatzki's, 2001, p. 2) are akin 
to institutional logics and the meaning they provide to material practices (Thornton, Ocasio 
and Lounsbury, 2012). 
Practices are therefore a way of putting ‘logics in action’ (Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013), of 
instantiating order and logics (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). As an example, Lounsbury and 
Crumley (2007) reflect on the pounding of a nail, which is ‘devoid of deeper social meaning’, 
unless seen as part of the set of practices that constitute ‘professional carpentry’ (p. 295). In 
yet another example, Friedland and Alford (1991, p. 249) reflect on how the practice of voting 
instantiates the logics of democracy. However, practices are not mere embodiments of logics: 
practices can also be the center of institutional logics’ change (see Jarzabkowski, 2004; 
Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007). 
Notwithstanding, little is known about how changes in practices can either drive changes in 
logics or reflect the adaptation of practices to changing logics. If practices are instantiations of 
logics, we need to better understand how is it that practice variation can imply a logic variation, 
namely across different spatial and temporal contexts (Boxenbaum, 2006; Czarniawska & 
                                                 
 “The congas we do at our parties […] are the most beautiful of the whole of Rome […] as they are leading 
nowhere” (our translation). 
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Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevon, 2005). We also need to better understand other elements 
inherent to these dynamics: on the one hand, practice variation might not always imply a logic 
variation; on the other hand, changes in practices might be part of a shift in a logic, most likely 
that we are still not aware of. 
Extant literature has emphasized the plurality of logics and the combination of multiple logics, 
largely overlooking changes occurring in one specific institutional logic and how these are 
either reflected in or driven by material practices. In this paper we follow the logics of religion 
and the changes it went through in the 16th century. More specifically, we analyse how a 
material practice, the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, both embodied and enacted 
changes in the logics of religion. In the Western Christian tradition, the logics of religion is 
mainly driven by the relationship between God and the faithful. More specifically, the logics 
of religion deals with the question: how does God speak to the faithful and how can the faithful 
have access to God’s word/will? Within Catholicism, the religion on which our paper is 
focused, God reveals Himself through the Scriptures, Tradition and the hierarchical mediation 
of the Church as the main interpreter of Scriptures and Tradition and as the institution which 
legitimizes dogma. With modernity, the individual is put at the centre of the relationship with 
God. However, putting the individual at the centre is not the same as putting reason at the 
centre. On the contrary: it is through affects and embodied practices that the individual searches 
for God (Endean, 2001). It is against such backdrop that the Spiritual Exercises emerge as a 
practice for embodying and discerning the affects that result from a direct communication 
between the individual and God. 
Our findings show that the Jesuit Spiritual Exercises changed the relevance of the hierarchical 
mediation of the Church (the logics of Catholicism) and blended it with a direct relationship 
between the individual and God (the logics of Protestantism). However, the Spiritual Exercises 
are not about the mere blending of multiple logics. Instead, the Spiritual Exercises are a 
material practice which does not embody ‘God’s will’, which is mysterious, but guides the 
individual through a series of ‘steps’ (‘places’, in Certeau’s (1973) words) that will allow the 
individual to eventually access ‘God’s will’. 
Our findings are relevant for practice driven institutionalism because they show that the 
material practices do not need to produce or provide access to institutional logics so as to 
instantiate them. In the case of the Spiritual Exercises, it is the mysterious nature of the material 
practice that a) allows the diffusion of the institutional logic and b) underpins the logic of 
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religion. The Spiritual Exercises are particularly interesting because they are a book, a material 
object which is itself a practice. The material elements of the book allowed it to be printed and 
therefore materially diffused. However, the book is designed to “be practiced” (Quattrone, 
2009) and in that sense the book is a practice itself and diffused even if not fully understood. 
Finding ‘God’s will’ is therefore about the mysterious engagement with a book-as-practice, in 
which the individual practices the search for ‘God’s will’ without ever being fully certain that 
such will is ever found. That is: ‘God’s will’ is always mysterious and unachievable but it is 
precisely such mystery that underpins the constant search of what might never be found and 
sets the conditions for the logic of religion to have a multiple and fluid ontology (Mol, 1999), 
which, we argue, is what allows such a logic to diffuse and persist across space and time. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on practice driven 
institutionalism. Second, we discuss whether god can be represented. This will allow us to 
introduce the Spiritual Exercises and the different ways used in it so as to explore the 
relationship between an individual and god. Lastly, we discuss the implications of our findings 
for institutionalism and for practice driven institutionalism more specifically. 
Literature review 
Practice-driven institutionalism 
Practice-driven institutionalism (PDI) is about the micro dynamics that might account for 
institutional stability and change. More specifically, PDI abridges a practice theory’s ‘large 
ontology’ (Seidl & Whittington, 2014) with institutionalism’s ‘top-down ontology’ (Smets, 
Aristidou & Whittington, 2017). In this paper we focus on how practices might shed light on 
the dynamics of institutional logics. To do so, we will centre our analysis on the institutional 
order of religion, allegedly one of the less studied within organization studies. 
The look for the “microfoundations of institutions” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008) in institutional 
logics is not new. As an example, Glaser, Fast, Harmon, & Green Jr. (2016) have shown how 
institutional logics can drive individual action through a network of schemas; in yet another 
example, Zilber calls for research on ‘institutions as reified entities’ (2016, p. 139). This call 
is akin to Hallett & Ventresca’s (2006) ‘inhabited institutions’ and to a search for how 
‘institutional logics work on the ground’ (Zilber, 2016, p. 139). 
The look for the “microfoundations of institutions” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008) also informed a 
practice perspective on institutions (Jarzabkowski, Smets, Bednarek, Burke & Spee, 2013; 
Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013). Within PDI, some studies have looked into the impact of 
institutions on practices (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007), whereas others have uncovered the 
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impact of practices on institutional logics (Smets, Morris & Greenwood, 2012). The turn to 
practice within institutionalism has emphasized ‘material practices’ (Friedland & Alford, 1991) 
and, more specifically, institutional logics have been defined as simultaneously material and 
ideal (Friedland & Alford, 1991). However, the material has been largely overlooked when 
compared to the ideal and symbolic, as “materiality has been interpreted primarily as practices 
and structures, and rarely as physical objects” (Jones, Boxenbaum & Callen, 2013, p. 51). 
Bringing objects into institutionalism opens important venues of research about how 
“institutions are created, maintained, and disrupted through the combination of humans, 
language, and material entities” (Monteiro and Nicolini 2014, p.74). 
The material can further our understanding of how institutions and institutional logics are 
created, legitimised and maintained. However, material practices have been analysed as distinct 
from material objects, even though both are recognised as capable of inscribing norms of 
behaviour. Material practices have distinctive properties when compared with material objects. 
Even though this might explain their analytical distinction in extant literature, both material 
practices and material objects can be durable (Jones et al., 2013), immutable and mobile 
(Latour 1993). Moreover, objects, such as churches (Jones & Massa, 2013) or maps (Latour 
1993) induce material practices. As a consequence of the analytical distinction between 
material practices and material objects, the possibility that an object can be seen as action in 
itself (Fabbri, 1998), thus being a practice rather than inducing a practice, has been largely 
overlooked. Instead, the emphasis has been put on the affordances of an object, raising 
questions around which practices does an object afford. Furthermore, materiality is also about 
instantiation, raising questions around which actions are available to individuals. Be it a 
practice or an object, something is material as long as it enacts action and generates 
consequences (Law and Singleton, 2005). Paradoxically, from this perspective, even the lack 
of materiality can be material: absences, lacks and silences are all material, not because they 
are defined, touchable and finite, but because they generate actions and effects (Giovannoni 
and Quattrone, 2018). Hence, the material status of an object can change with time, becoming 
immaterial in case it is not used. 
Miller (2005) speaks about how the material is made even more relevant, the more immaterial 
it becomes. This is particularly true in religion: ‘a belief in the ultimate truth as a form of 
immateriality is still commonly expressed through material forms and practices’ (Miller, 2005, 
p. 7). Even so, the materiality of an object is not capable of revealing every possible practice 
unleashed by the object. Therefore, an object grounds the immaterial without grounding it. 
Objects are uncapable of enclosing all the possible venues for action. Because of such 
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incapability, objects are ontologically mysterious insofar as they never reveal, neither the 
outcomes of their acting, nor the possibilities of action they enclose. 
The ontologically mysterious nature of objects has been largely overlooked, we claim, because 
after the ‘sociomaterial’ turn (Orlikowski, 2007), the social and the material were approached 
has being ‘strongly entangled’ (Carlile, Nicolini, Langley & Tsoukas, 2013, p. 7). Instead of 
being entangled, we argue, the social and the material can be fused. Therefore, we ask: can a 
practice and an object coalesce? The answer to this question can be particularly enlightening 
in the context of the institutional order of religion. 
 
The logics of religion 
Two main issues drive the logics of religion. First, the question of imagining and seeing the 
divine: how can we represent, ’see’ (with the eyes of imagination) or feel the presence of God? 
Second, the question of ‘listening’ to the divine: how can we interpret god? These two elements 
underpinning the logics of religion bring to the fore the ‘tension between the iconic/visual and 
the aniconic/aural representations of God’ (Wolfson, 1994, p. 4). What is the proper 
interpretation of God? How can we be sure about visions of God? How can we know what God 
says? 
Our case is particularly useful to enlighten the dynamics of the institutional order of religion. 
The problematics of seeing and listening to god are present in the Spiritual Exercises, through, 
as an example, the use of imagery and the role of the director of the Exercises. However, the 
practice of the Exercises does not embody any image of god. Neither does it embody god’s 
will. On the contrary: the practice of the Exercises embodies mystery, that is, the impossibility 
of fully grasping god’s essence and truth, as this would reduce its complexity and omnipotence. 
We then ask: what is so mysterious about the Spiritual Exercises that allows them to be 
practiced even if not understood? This is, we argue, the key difference between ‘practice-driven 
institutionalism’ and ‘mystery-driven institutionalism’. 
Practice-driven institutionalism (PDI) seems to rely on the assumption that practices are a force 
that determines action. The fact that ‘institutional and practice theorists share in the seminal 
work of Bourdieu (1977; 1990), Giddens (1980) and Foucault (1980)’ (Smets et al., 2017, p. 
367) points to a common understanding of subjectivity. As Certeau, highlights, it relies on the 
subject’s ‘docta ignorantia’ (1984, p. 56): practices drive action even though the subject is not 
aware of such force. Such understanding locates the subject’s drive for action in external 
structural conditions. Even if practices are understood as situated, embedded and improvised, 
they are so according to ‘local, temporal and social norms’ and ‘can only be examined and 
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understood within a specific context: temporal, spatial, historical and – above all – relational’ 
(Smets et al., 2017, p. 370). This leaves aside the possibility of agency being transcendent. 
Such transcendence does not mean that agency results from yet another ‘structure’, located 
beyond ‘this world’. Instead, the possibility that agency is transcendent means that agency is 
an ontological characteristic of the acting individual. Such possibility would imply that agency 
is devoid of meaning, and that such absence of meaning is, as a fact, immanent in action: 
absence of meaning is what pervades action. Such immanence of meaning in action is made 
clear in our findings. The Exercises, as a practice, imply a constant search for ‘God’s will’, 
which is not ‘out there’ to be found, in a classic subject-object relationship. Instead, ‘God’s 
will’ unfolds as the individual practices the search for it. In that sense, God’s transcendental 
will is not yet another layer. Such understanding would place religion, namely Catholicism, 
closer to idealism than to God (Endean, 2001, p. 26).  
A similar line of reasoning has already been developed regarding objects. As an example, 
Giovannoni and Quattrone (2018) have shown the materiality of absences and how gaps, 
incompleteness and absences can produce organizing effects. Such conclusion is in line with 
Knorr Cetina’s (2001) epistemic object concept, where the incompleteness scientific 
representations stimulates a recursive process of investigation (p. 176). Knorr Cetina’s (2001) 
“objectual practice” is also relevant for our discussion insofar as they transform themselves 
and the “entities formed by the relationship” (p. 185) between objects and practices. That is, 
whereas objects are characterized by incompleteness, practices are characterized by an 
“underlying relational dynamic” (Knorr Cetina, 2001, p. 184) and by the “regular branching 
off of strands of practice” (Knorr Cetina, 2001, p. 186). The relational dynamic dimension is 
Lacanian and highlights how the structures of wanting/desire allow the practice to transform 
itself together with the entities that surround the practice. 
Even though such insights have been part of extant literature for some time (e.g. Quattrone, 
2009), the notion of  “objectual practice” (Knorr Cetina, 2001) has been overlooked by 
practice-driven institutionalists. The main reason for it, we claim, is that extant literature relies 
on the assumption that a) materiality is important to embody institutions, and b) practices 
embody preferences which even though located in time and space and therefore situated, are 
still the reflection of shared norms and values that stand beyond the individual instead of being 
transcendent. 
This possibility might further our understanding of the logics of religion where the 
unknowability of God’s mystery makes the theorization of such embodiment problematic and 
in need of further exploration. The search for the ‘will of God’ which underpins the logics of 
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religion would then have to look for what is transcendent, instead of looking for internal 




Notwithstanding the growing interest of historical methods in organisation studies (Rowlinson, 
Hassard, & Decker, 2014; Suddaby, Foster, & Mills, 2014), and their alleged relevance to 
further studies informed by institutionalism, historical case studies are still the exception. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of the research that is underpinned by historical case studies 
does not go beyond the 19th century (Rowlinson et al., 2014; Kieser, 1987; Ruef & Harness, 
2009). 
Our study is longitudinal and extends throughout more than 400 years of history of the 
Exercises. This poses some methodological challenges. First, which sources to choose? 
Second, how to connect sources that are so dispersed in time? Third, how to analyse sources 
which were produced in different temporal contexts? The following paragraphs make visible 
our research design and our analytical strategy. 
 
Research design 
Our paper draws on historical primary and secondary sources that cover the period starting in 
1522, when Ignatius of Loyola started writing the book of the Spiritual Exercises. Four hundred 
years later, in 1922, Pope Pius XI declared Ignatius of Loyola the ‘Patron Saint of spiritual 
retreats’, a distinction which recognised the role of the Spiritual Exercises in the 
institutionalisation of the ‘spiritual retreat’ in the Catholic Church. The Spiritual Exercises, as 
a retreat, are important to understand the shift in the logics of Catholic religion insofar as they 
materialise the possibility of God revealing His will to an individual, hence overcoming the 
almost exclusive role of the Church as a hierarchical mediator between God and the individual.  
This led us to implement a temporal bracketing strategy (see Langley, 1999), which divided 
the 400 years period into 3 main periods. The first period goes from 1522 till 1556 (when 
Ignatius of Loyola died); the second period goes from 1556 till 1773 (when the Jesuits were 
suppressed); the third period goes from 1814 (when the Jesuits were restored) till 1922 (when 
Ignatius of Loyola was declared ‘Patron of spiritual retreats’. This allowed us to uncover 




Our aim was to understand how the Spiritual Exercises, as ‘a book to be practiced’ (Quattrone, 
2009), allowed the exercitant to find ‘God’s will’. Therefore, we started by collecting primary 
and secondary sources on the contents of the Spiritual Exercises. We consulted the translated 
version of the Spiritual Exercises, together with notes on how they were delivered and which 
we consulted in the Jesuit archives in the Vatican, the Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu 
(ARSI). We complemented these notes with ethnographic notes one of the authors took while 
doing the Spiritual Exercises. We used the latter to trace which elements of the practice are 
still in use and how the book is performed. 
Further to analyses of various secondary sources, like Hendrickson (2013), we chose the 
primary sources used in our analysis of the period that goes from 1556 to 1773. Between 
Ignatius of Loyola’s death (1556) and the worldwide suppression of the Jesuits by the Vatican 
(1773), the practice of the Exercises was the target of various controversies, opposing those 
who favoured its ascetic elements to those who saw in it a method underpinning the mysterious 
revelation of ‘God’s will’ (see, inter alia, Certeau, 1995, and Hendrickson, 2013, for a fuller 
discussion). This led us to consult spiritual treatises which were widely published in the 16th, 
17th and 18th centuries. We chose the most impactful, using as a criterion those which were 
more widely translated and published (some well into the mid 20th century). 
For the period that goes from the reestablishment of the Jesuits by the Vatican (1814) till the 
institutionalisation of Ignatius of Loyola as ‘Patron of spiritual retreats’ (1922), we consulted 
sources related to Father Jan Roothaan, that can be found in the Archivum Romanum Societatis 
Iesu (ARSI). Roothaan was the global leader of the Jesuits (known as Superior General) during 
the 19th century, being known as the ‘General of the Exercises’ for his efforts in the 
reestablishment of the practice to its original status. 
 
Data analysis 
In line with studies on institutionalism which took a historical angle (Greenwood, Suddaby, & 
Hinings, 2002; Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003; Wright & Zammuto, 2013), we first made a 
detailed reading of the data. At this stage we were able to uncover the main drivers of the 
practice of the Spiritual Exercises, namely the tensions between their ascetic and mystical 
nature. Second, we developed a narrative of the practice of the Spiritual Exercises. We then 
pursued the materials to recover the network of practices clustered around the Spiritual 
Exercises, together with the network of ‘spiritual treatises’ and other books developed so as 
diffuse the practice across time and space. 
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Our data analysis was iterative in nature (Langley, 1999; Langley et al., 2013) and informed 
by the hermeneutic tradition (Philips & Brown, 1993). The data was analysed vis-à-vis the 
historical, social and cultural context in which they were produced (Kipping, Wadhwani, & 
Bucheli, 2014). Our hermeneutic strategy was upheld by the fact that the authors are experts 
on the history of the Jesuits, and one of them has practised the Spiritual Exercises in their 
entirety (one month of retreat). For that reason, ethnographic notes were used so as to uncover 




The book as a practice: ‘paths leading nowhere’ 
One of the most remarkable, and often forgotten characteristics of the book of the Spiritual 
Exercises is its openness. The Spiritual Exercises provide the reader with a series of rules on 
how to meditate, on how to examine the conscience, on how to discern ‘God’s will’. All these 
elements that compose the Spiritual Exercises provide the reader with a series of ‘steps’ 
(Certeau, 1973) to follow so as to find ‘God’s will’. However, the Exercises never provide 
content regarding what is ‘God’s will’. Neither do the Exercises provide details on the full 
meaning of most of its meditations, suggesting instead how to meditate as opposed to what the 
meditation might lead to. Such openness underpinned the development of other spirituality 
books written by Jesuits to complete what Ignatius left unfinished. As an example, such 
spirituality books suggested passages of the Bible that complement the meditation on the birth 
of Christ. However, how the exercitant would reach ‘God’s will’ by meditating on the birth of 
Christ would always be left open. That is: ‘God’s will’ is not captured by the meditation on the 
birth of Christ (as an example of a meditation found in the Exercises). Instead, it is the 
practicing of the meditation that might reveal (or not) ‘God’s will’, even though such purpose 
is not even mentioned in this meditation. 
A good example of such spiritual works that were written to support the Exercises is Luís de 
La Palma’s (1559-1641) ‘Historia de la Sagrada Pasion’, originally published in 1627. In it, 
Palma wrote that those who meditate using the Exercises ‘lack material content’ (Palma 
[1627]/1786, p. 1. Authors’ translation from the original Spanish). Hence Palma’s objective: 
to provide those who practiced the Exercises with ‘points on which they can occupy their 
thoughts with some gains’ (Palma, [1627]/1786, p. 1). The open character of the Exercises was 
Palma’s ([1627]/1786) main motivation to write the ‘Historia de la Sagrada Pasion’, not the 
least because those reading any book always look for something that ‘moves their will, which 
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they will not find in this Book’ (in the Spanish original Palma refers to the Exercises as ‘Libro’ 
(Book); see Palma, [1627]/1786, p. 4). Hence the Exercises ‘being known only by a very few, 
and understood by even less people’ (Palma, [1627]/1786, p. 4). 
Palma’s work (1786) was not unique. Other Jesuit authors became famous for the spiritual 
books they wrote to complete what Ignatius had left open in the Exercises. Another good 
example is Louis Lallemant (1578-1635), whose book ‘Doctrine Spirituelle’ (1694) would, 
just as Palma’s, impact generations of Jesuits up until the late 19th, early 20th centuries. 
Lallemant’s ‘Doctrine Spirituelle’ is in fact a collection of presentations he gave to Jesuits 
completing their final stage of formation, known as Tertianship. One of the ‘Doctrine 
Spirituelle’s’ sections is based on Jean-Joseph Surin’s (1600-1665) notes, a Jesuit who was the 
‘main character’ of Michel de Certeau’s book The Possession at Loudun (2000). Lallemant and 
Surin are part of the ‘école française’ of mysticism (Bartók, 2017), which Certeau analysed as 
part of his work on the mystiques (see Certeau, 1995, 2000, 2015). Lallemant’s work is 
particularly relevant insofar as it brings to light the controversies, within the Jesuits, around 
the mystical vis-à-vis ascetical character of the Spiritual Exercises (Certeau, 1995). Such 
controversies were never settled. As late as the early 20th century, Lallemant’s work, and the 
discussion it informed, were still relevant. And so was the work of Alfonso Rodríguez (1538-
1616), a major figure in the ascetical interpretation of the Exercises, whose book ‘Ejercicio de 
perfección y virtudes cristianas’ was still being translated and published in the mid 20th 
century. 
In the context of our paper, the controversies around the correct interpretation of the Exercises 
are testament to the open nature of the book. By leaving the practice the book of the Exercises 
entails open, Ignatius allowed the book and the practice to be appropriated differently. Without, 
however, limiting the development throughout the centuries of a particular form of spirituality 
within Catholic tradition, known as ‘Ignatian spirituality’. In that sense, the idea of ‘points’ to 
guide the meditation was paramount for the institutionalisation of the Spiritual Exercises. 
Throughout the centuries, what the book does not say was filled in with points to guide the 
meditations. Such tradition still informs the practice today. 
Among the elements of the Spiritual Exercises which was left open is what Ignatius described 
as indifference towards ‘God’s will’: ‘it is necessary to make ourselves indifferent to all 
created things, in regard to everything which is left to our free will and is not forbidden. 
Consequently, on our own part we ought not to seek health rather than sickness, wealth rather 
than poverty, honor rather than dishonor, a long life rather than a short one, and so on in all 
other matters. Rather, we ought to desire and choose only that which is more conducive to the 
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end for which we are created.’ (SE, §23. Emphasis added). Indifference stands at the beginning 
of the Spiritual Exercises, literally as the foundation of the entire experience of search for 
‘God’s will’. Ignatian indifference underpins the search for ‘God’s will’ insofar as it is a 
measure (Rahner, 1971) of the objectivity needed so as to take decisions. In this sense, 
indifference is about the detachment of ‘all created things’ (SE, §23). However, such 
detachment is neither of a stoic kind, nor related to any ascetic drive (Endean, 2001). Instead, 
indifference is about becoming indifferent (Rahner, 1971). Therefore, the search for ‘God’s 
will’ for the individual, which cannot be clearly expressed, implies a profound relationship 
with ‘all created things’ (SE, §23): the individual neither desires health, nor sickness; neither 
wealth, nor poverty; neither honour, nor dishonour; neither a long life, nor a short one. All 
things created are good, and mediums towards God. Hence, the foundation of the Spiritual 
Exercises rests on the relational engagement with everything and nothing at the same time. The 
individual has no preference, except ‘God’s will’, which allows them to prefer anything 
deemed useful for the service of the ultimate end. Anything that is worldly can then be 
transcended through indifference (Endean, 2001). Because of such characteristic, Jesuit 
indifference allows the individual to accommodate any thought, practice or object. As Endean 
(2001) puts it, ‘all possession of God must allow God to be greater than any possession’ (p. 
88). 
Notwithstanding the apparent easiness with which one can apprehend the type of normativity 
indifference generates, what strikes as particularly interesting for us is the experience and the 
mode of relation to the self that indifference implies. Moreover, as the Spiritual Exercises are 
a retreat to be practiced under the guidance of a Master/Director, we are particularly interested 
in how is it that the master moves the individual towards indifference without imposing content 
and without any pre-defined rationalities concerning ‘God’s will’ for that individual. 
 
The book as a stage for performance 
Looking at the role of the Master/Director of the Spiritual Exercises allows us to gain a fuller 
understanding of how the individual can search for the mystery of ‘God’s will’ without such 
will ever being determined. 
The role of the master of the Exercises was addressed in several Directories published in the 
16th century and in several spiritual treatises from the following centuries. As an example, 
Lallemant’s spiritual manual starts by providing points to meditate on the ‘Principle and 
foundation’. Lallemant expands the idea of indifference into several points (which those who 
posthumously published Lallemant’s reflections on the Exercises organized as ‘principles’) for 
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meditation. Indifference is associated with the ‘void’: ‘There is a void in our heart which all 
creatures united would be unable to fill. God alone can fill it.’ (Lallemant, [1694]/1855, p. 37, 
Principle 1, §1); ‘Creatures desire to take the place of our last end, and we ourselves more 
than all, we desire to be our own last end.’ (Lallemant, [1694]/1855, p. 38, Principle 1, §2), 
‘To seek God is to wish for nothing and to desire nothing but that which He wills, and which 
He ordains by His providence’ (Lallemant, [1694]/1855, p. 43, Principle 2, §1). 
In the 19th and 20th centuries, other works were published on how to meditate using the 
Exercises. Examples of which are Roothaan’s, who also reflected on the Ignatian principle of 
indifference as ‘tantum quantum’: a ‘Règle de conduit: rien de plus, rien de moins’ (See 
‘Puncta Meditationum et Instructionum Spiritualium’, pp. 433-542). Yet another example, we 
found, in the Jesuit archives, are the points for meditation written by Jean Grou and Mazzolari 
(see ARSI, Exercitia, 4; ARSI, Exercitia, 5; and ARSI, Exercitia, 6) in the early 20th century. 
The development of ‘points for meditation’ around the Exercises’ initial meditation on 
indifference entails a series of practices (meditations), which were complemented with further 
written elaborations by future generations of Jesuits on how the exercitant could relate to the 
book. 
In this sense, the Exercises’ meditations open ‘paths leading nowhere’ (Certeau, 1995, p. 62). 
The fact that the practice ‘leads nowhere’ is concomitant with the ‘literarily impoverished’ 
nature of the Exercises: what is absent in the text, the voids which populate it, are fundamental 
to open the mysterious nature of ‘God’s will’. As Barthes (1976) puts it, referring precisely to 
the Jesuit Exercises, ‘language is merely the docile and insignificant [italics in the original] 
instrument for the serious things that occur in the spirit’ (p. 39). The voids that populate the 
Exercises underpin the development of multiple texts (Barthes, 1976) entailing a polyvocal 
construction of ‘God’s will’: the director of the Exercises (as responsible for presenting the 
meditation points to the exercitant), the exercitant and God, all concur to the mysterious 
construction, through an ‘acted text’ (Barthes, 1976, p. 42), of ‘God’s will’. Hence the nature 
of the Exercises as a practice, whose aim ‘does not consist in generating new lights for 
intelligibility, but in extinguishing it’ (Certeau, 1995, p. 72). 
The points, or topics, generated to complete what the Exercises left incomplete were ordered 
into a sequence (a ‘discursus’; Certeau, 1995, p. 120), a process, that allowed the exercitant to 
order the manner of speaking with God, without ever determining the contents of such 
mysterious conversation. The Exercises are therefore not a set of given ideals to be practiced: 
it is the exercises themselves which are to be practiced and therefore become practices 
themselves. Their text, and the texts which complement it, bring to the fore the circumstances 
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in which a conversation with God occurs; they do not establish what is spoken. In this sense, 
how the practice is practiced (practicing) is more relevant than the representation of the 
practice. Such understanding of the Exercises as a practice is made visible on how, throughout 
the centuries, what was institutionalised was the practicing of the Exercises, through constant 
adaptations of the meditations, and not ‘what was said’ in the conversation the exercitant had 
with God. 
 
Body and emotions 
By establishing an itinerary, the Exercises become an opportunity for performing a search. 
However, performing such a search is not only the result of the ‘steps’ (Certeau, 1973) that 
constitute the practice, but also of the conditions under which the practice is ‘to be practiced’. 
The Exercises call for a disposition: ´retreat in a place shut away, solitary, and above all 
unaccustomed, lighting conditions (adapted to the subject of the meditation), dispositions of 
the room where the exercitant is to stay, positions (kneeling, prostrate, standing, sitting, gazing 
upward), facial expression, which must be restrained’ (Barthes, 1976, p. 48). In the notes taken 
by one of the authors while doing the 30 days Spiritual Exercises, we can find: ‘shut the blinds 
of the room while meditating on the ‘Passion of Christ’; never address or look in the eyes of 
other exercitants during the retreat; during the third week [meditations on the Passion of 
Christ], and while having the meals, listen to music that is not joyful, like ‘Mozart’s Requiem’ 
or ‘Bach’s Passions’; look for discomfort during the third week; the opposite applies during 
the fourth week [meditations on the ‘Resurrection of Christ’]’. 
These elements are part of the Exercises’ attempt to stimulate imagination. Having the correct 
facial expression while meditating on the ‘Passion of Christ’ prepares the exercitant for 
imagining what Christ went through during his trial and execution (as an example); yet another 
example, is the imagination of hell: 
 
‘The First Prelude [italics in the original], the composition of place. Here it will be to see in 
imagination the length, breadth, and depth of hell. 
The Second Prelude [italics in the original], to ask for what I desire. Here it will be to ask for 
an interior sense of the pain suffered by the damned, so that if through my faults I should forget 
the love of the Eternal Lord, at least the fear of those pains will serve to keep me from falling 
into sin. 
The First Point [italics in the original] will be to see with the eyes of the imagination the huge 
fires and, so to speak, the souls within the bodies full of fire. 
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The Second Point [italics in the original]. In my imagination I will hear the wailing, the 
shrieking, the cries, and the blasphemies against our Lord and all his saints. 
The Third Point [italics in the original]. By my sense of smell I will perceive the smoke, the 
sulphur, the filth, and the rotting things. 
The Fourth Point [italics in the original]. By my sense of taste I will experience the bitter 
flavors of hell: tears, sadness, and the worm of conscience. 
The Fifth Point [italics in the original]. By my sense of touch, I will feel how the flames touch 
the souls and burn them.’ (SE, §65-70) 
 
This quote, taken from the meditation on the Spiritual Exercises, is one example of how the 
Jesuits were inclined towards the image and the penitential act as elements of indoctrination. 
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, Jesuits would explore these traits of their spirituality 
using other forms, like predications. Jesuit predications and missions tended towards the 
‘spectacular’, exploring the power of the visual and of theatre. Jesuits adopted this strategy 
across the world. As an example, Paolo Segneri, an Italian priest, became famous for his 
popular missions. Together with his companion, Juan Pedro Piamonente, Paolo Segneri usually 
spent one week in one Italian village predicating about the final judgment, the passion of Christ 
and death. While doing this, his Jesuit companion, Juan Pedro Piamonente, devoted himself to 
catechesis and confessions. This kind of mission, known as popular mission, typically ended 
on a Sunday, with a procession and penitential acts. At the end of the procession, Juan Pedro 
Piamonente would make a sermon on the salvation of the soul and invite people to take the 
‘holy communion’. Before leaving the village, Juan Pedro Piamonente and Paolo Segneri 
distributed devotional images (‘estampas’), together with recommendations on simple spiritual 
exercises they could perform on their own so that the outcomes of the mission could endure. 
Paolo Segneri is testimony to the introduction of dramatic elements, like as an example 
flagellation, into the performances inspired by the Spiritual Exercises. Some of these 
performances were rather violent: flagellation inflicting serious wounds to the flesh, 
transforming repent and the penitential acts into something individuals could literally see. 
Performing the Spiritual Exercises was considered crucial for ‘moving the soul’ and work on 
the emotions that could reveal ‘God’s will’. That is why many suggested that some penitential 
acts should be performed during the night, accompanied by chants, candles and incense. The 
theatre and the performances accompanying it were supposed to drive the senses and the 
emotions. The stimulation of senses was particularly relevant, especially in a context in which 
it was believed the ‘devil’ could be smelled (Certeau, 2000). 
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As for the sermons, these focused mainly on death, the final judgment and the passion precisely 
to trigger emotions and work on the senses. That is also why the sermons would be 
complemented with visual artefacts (like images): pictorial language, images of hell and people 
eternally condemned, were used to complement the practice of the Spiritual Exercises. The use 
of visual elements for the contemplation of God’s mystery was rather centred on imagining 
Christ (with imagination being rather visual by itself). For example, the individual was invited 
to ‘see’ the ‘Passion of Christ’. The senses and emotions were crucial for the Exercises, to the 
extent that all the meditations of the Exercises were accompanied by a set of images. Upon the 
request of Ignatius of Loyola, a volume was prepared with printed scenes of the Gospel 
(‘Evangelicae historiae imagines’, published in 1593), together with another volume with 
annotations and meditations to accompany the images (‘Adnotationes et meditationes in 
Evangelia’, published in 1594). The purpose of the images accompanying the meditations was 
to turn the invisible visible. Jesuit emblems were not just images: an entire theory of the 
emblem was developed by prominent Jesuits, like for example Athanasius Kircher [1602–
1680]. The images supporting the Exercises were not representations per se. Instead, they 
carried within them the mystery of God: ‘the effect of fascination may be such that the gaze 
cannot release itself from the mystery of the image’ (Dekoninck, 2017). 
 
The master of the Exercises 
Throughout the seventeenth-century Jesuits truncated the sections of the Spiritual Exercises in 
which finding ‘God’s will’ was emphasised. Nieremberg, a seventeenth-century Jesuit, for 
example, gave prominence to only three sections of the Exercises (Hendrickson, 2013). The 
reasons for delivering the Exercises truncated were manifold. First, the Exercises, as a retreat, 
were not suitable for everyone. The Exercises were to be adapted according to the individual’s 
‘age, education, and ability’ (SE, §18). Second, because the Exercises allowed each individual 
to find ‘God’s will’ for themselves, they were often seen as potentially leading to heresy or the 
diminishing of the mediating role of the Church. More specifically, by putting the individual 
in a direct relationship with God, the Exercises were too close to heretic movements like the 
Alumbrados (see Certeau, 1995; O’Reilly, 2020). Third, the Exercises’ meditations were 
inherently complex, and therefore needed the guidance of a master. The published Directories 
(Palmer, 1996) on how to guide the Exercises allow us to better understand how, throughout 
the centuries, the master guided the exercitant without imposing any content into ‘God’s will’. 
Indifference plays a crucial role here. 
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The first directions on how to move towards indifference appear in the text of the Exercises: 
‘the one giving the Exercises ought not to lean or incline in either direction but rather, while 
standing by like the pointer of a scale in equilibrium, to allow the Creator to deal immediately 
with the creature and the creature with its Creator and Lord’ (SE, §15). In what is known as 
the ‘Autograph Directory of St, Ignatius’ (Palmer, 1996), indifference is referred to several 
times as crucial for discerning, through emotions of desolation and consolation, ‘God’s will’. 
For example, ‘he should examine, when he finds himself in consolation, in which direction God 
is moving him; similarly in desolation’ (Palmer, 1996, p. 9). Consolation refers to the set of 
emotions that imply joy, love and hope, whereas desolation refers to emotions like ‘sadness, 
lack of confidence, lack of love, dryness, and so on’ (Palmer, 1996, p. 9). The role of the master 
is to help the exercitant interpret the emotions, but not to interpret them or point in any 
direction, allowing the exercitant to discover ‘things by himself’ (Directory of Juan Alonso de 
Vitoria, circa 1555; Palmer, 1996, p. 19). In the same directory, the emphasis is put on 
preserving the order of meditations. Juan Alonso de Vitoria (circa 1555) says that Ignatius 
himself ‘insisted on this very strongly’ (translated in Palmer, 1996, p. 22) so the exercitant 
progresses towards finding ‘God’s will’. 
How indifference should be meditated was rather simple: ‘He should lay down the foundation 
in three points: the purpose for which man was made; the functions of creatures; and his own 
behavior in the use of them’ (Notes of St. Peter Canisius, 1521-1597; translated in Palmer, 
1996, p. 41). The formal analysis of indifference in this way was not unique to St. Peter 
Canisius. Duarte Pereyra (1527-1587), made a similar division advising the master to do the 
following: ‘the first, on self-knowledge through causes, the second on self-knowledge through 
effects, and the third on indifference’ to all things (circa 1562; translated by Palmer, 1996, p. 
52). Such formal analysis of emotions (tracing their cause, effect and contrasting them with 
indifferent desire) is also present in Rahner’s 20th century (published in 1971) notes on how to 
deliver the Exercises. In yet another example, Fessard’s study (2010) of the Exercises points 
to a similar way of structuring the indifference principle. Such way of explaining indifference 
is still widely used in nowadays Exercises by the Jesuits directing them. 
Indifference is not only the starting point of the Exercises. Indifference functions as a way of 
accommodating the multitude of personal situations for which the individual searches for 
‘God’s will’. The practice of the Exercises does not, however, produce indifference. Instead, 
through a mysterious engagement with the Exercises, the individual can become closer to their 
ultimate end, God, although such end can only be reached upon death (Endean, 2001). The 
unintelligibility of the practice matches the unintelligibility of God – the practice of the 
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Exercises is pure ‘proceduralism’ (Quattrone, 2015) without a goal, a meaning, and end rather 
than God himself. Such mysterious ‘proceduralism’ is concomitant with the multitude of 
practices that the Exercises generated throughout history: truncated versions of the text, 
sermons, predications, uses of images, retreats guided by a master, as detailed throughout our 





In Jesuit spirituality, indifference establishes a link between a practice and being truthful to 
‘God’s will’. Indifference is not something the individual is, but that the individual will be: 
indifference is only reached with death (Rahner, 1971). Hence the relevance of the use of things 
as a means towards God, even though we never fully reach a state of pure indifference towards 
the worldly. Notwithstanding, a positive relationship (indifferent) with ‘all created things’ (SE, 
§23) puts the individual closer to God, whereas any alteration of the order of use of things puts 
the individual away from ‘God’s will’. Such disordering of things is sin (Rahner, 1971; 
Fessard, 2010). Hence the meditations on hell proposed in the Exercises. 
The meditations on Hell, just like the other meditations in the Exercises, bring indifference 
back to experience. Everything done in the Exercises, like the use of imagination or visual 
compositions, the gestures, or the use of the senses, put the exercitant in a tension between the 
imagined concreteness of experience and the displacement of the subject as indifferent, a state 
they will only reach upon death, when all things lose their use. Such tension is of relevance for 
our narrative, insofar as it establishes the difference between the individual subject and their 
multiple possible ways of being. The practicing, ad infinitum, of the Exercises is revelatory of 
the immanence of ‘God’s will’ in each individual’s own history (Endean, 2001). It is because 
‘God’s will’ cannot be captured for every instance of daily life that the individual is invited to 
practice the search for indifference on a daily basis: examinations of conscience, meditations, 
use of imagery for triggering reflection are all examples of how the text of the Exercises points 
towards an endless multiplicity and indetermination, revelatory of God’s mystery, which does 
not mean that the mystery of God is revealed. It rather means that the mystery of God is 
understood as such. 
However, the most relevant question surrounding the practicing of the Exercises remains 
unanswered: how do the Jesuits understand what they have to do if the book does not prescribe 
everything? Our case shows that mystery underpins the practicing of the Exercises throughout 
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the centuries. The book of the Exercises, the spirituality works that surrounded its diffusion 
and the imagery developed to prompt imagination, all embody the mystery surrounding ‘God’s 
will’, rather than the presence of ‘God’s will’. The Exercises, and the material elements that 
accompany them, never show something that is graspable. Instead, they present the mystery. 
In the case of the Exercises, mystery is about the manifestation of ‘God’s will’ to each 
individual that practices the book. The new logics of religion that the Jesuits diffused is not 
about what is revealed, but about what is mysteriously communicated by God to each 
individual. 
In that sense, the Exercises, understood as both a book and a practice, do not make the logics 
of religion visible. Therefore, the Exercises were diffused not because of the mobility of book-
as-practice, but because of the malleability of the construction of meanings it allows. By 
diffusing a logic of religion which is defined in terms of the mystery (surrounding ‘God’s 
will’), practicing the Exercises generates mystery, instead of generating stability of meanings. 
We expand below. 
The starting point of our theoretical framing of this paper is that extant literature of practice 
theory and institutionalism takes meaning for granted: both practices and institutions are 
imbued with meaning. This, we claim, leaves out the possibility that the absence of meaning 
might be as much a driver for action and order as a substantiated understanding of meaning, if 
not even more. Religion, understood as a regime of practices which assemble the unknown, the 
mysterious, the invisible and the silent, is the perfect setting for researching the possibility of 
order without meaning necessarily underpinning what actors do. Our paper has shown that in 
the case of the Exercises, neither human nor non-human actors have their action driven by any 
substantiated form of meaning. It is mystery (in our case, the search for the mysterious ‘will of 
God’) what drives action and orders the configurations of practices and material 
artefacts/objects which constitutes the ‘entified’ practiced of the Exercises and the 
institutionalized modern practice of ‘going into a retreat’. 
Our study’s contribution to practice-driven institutionalism in twofold. First, we show that 
practices can abridge the micro and the macro without necessarily substantiating or 
representing any taken for granted meaning. Second, we bring to the fore the role of mystery, 
which encompasses elements of social life largely overlooked in the literature which attempts 
the establishment of some link between the macro and the micro. Our study therefore highlights 
the relevance of openness, situatedness, embeddedness, incompleteness, ambiguity, paradox, 
silence, serendipity and emotions for furthering our understanding of the mutual constitution 
of practices and institutions. It shows how institutional life is both without and full of meaning. 
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It is without meaning as there is no overarching structure and set of beliefs and social norms 
which are written in stone, ready to be ‘isomorphically’ adopted or decoupled. It is full of 
meanings, as the power of institutions rests on their ability of attracting a potentially infinite 
multitude of selves, with their histories, own sets of beliefs and understandings. It is in the 
interplay between the mysterious nature of institutions and their reliance on practices, which 
make us all relate to this ineffable unknowable (without making us either succumb or 
overthrow the social norms that such institutions ignite), that a practice-driven institutionalism 
makes sense. A sense which can only make sense if one considers mystery (and not knowing) 
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